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1.1 Theme, purpose, and approach
What this book is about
This collaborative study intends in the first place to explore the incor-
poration of sharia-based1 rules in national legal systems. It tries to an-
swer pertinent questions about islamisation of law throughout the
Muslim world: Where? When? To what extent? How? Why? The fact
that since the 1970s a number of Muslim countries, notably Iran,
Pakistan and Sudan, have followed this course has been a cause for con-
cern, both in Muslim countries and in the West. It has suggested a side-
lining of modernising groups, weakening of the legal positions of wo-
men and religious minorities, and a return to cruel corporal punish-
ments. One can hardly avoid the impression that islamisation of law
equals disrespect for the rule of law and human rights. Yet, the discus-
sion about these developments is hardly based on actual facts; rather, it
is filled with controversy, speculation and all sorts of prejudices.
This book provides a factual and comparative overview of the role
and position of sharia-based law in the national legal systems of twelve,
representative Muslim countries. Each country study consists of two in-
terrelated parts. The first part of each chapter describes the history of
how the present legal systems of Muslim countries have been shaped
by socio-political developments. It records major changes in governance
and law, tracing in particular the role of Islam and sharia in this pro-
cess. The second part presents the actual legal situation and shows to
what extent national legal systems have or have not distanced them-
selves from the tenets of ‘classical sharia’ (see 1.2 below); these sections
also address the compatibility of these systems with the rule of law and
human rights (see 1.4 below). The country studies focus on those areas
of national law, where the introduction of sharia has caused most con-
cern, namely constitutional law, family and inheritance law, and crim-
inal law.
Purpose and perspectives
This book does not only offer a wealth of data, it also employs a set of
conceptual perspectives, or frames, in order to forge the data into a use-
ful body of knowledge.
Through our first frame, we look at a particular country and its na-
tional legal system, for we can only start to understand the relationship
between sharia and national law by looking at countries individually.
Therefore this book is in the first place a repository of country-based
knowledge. In addition, this frame also serves as a tool to gain insight
into the broader picture of ‘the Muslim world’. The first frame is
INTRODUCTION 19
further explained in 1.3 and 1.4. Preliminary results are presented in
the concluding chapter in 14.4.
Our second frame is thematic: the book focuses on what are probably
the four main concerns that have arisen and dominated the political de-
bate about sharia-based law over the last few decades. Those concerns
are the alleged supremacy of sharia, the status of women, degrading
punishments, and human rights. In this aspect, the book differentiates
itself from similar collections which usually focus on one single theme,
either constitutional law, or women, or criminal law, or human rights.
This frame is explained in 1.3, and results can be found in 14.3.
Our third perspective is historical. We look at how the relationship
between sharia and national law has evolved since 1800, with a focus
on the twentieth century, and following developments until the present
day. This is explained below in 1.6; results are summarised in 14.2.
Our fourth perspective is governance. It regards the relationship be-
tween sharia and national law essentially as a major challenge for each
state, i.e. to form and apply the main rules for a stable, prosperous, and
just society, interacting with major political players and social groups.
Section 14.5 reflects on governance aspects.
The fifth frame of this book addresses the struggle between ‘moder-
ates’ and ‘puritans’ in each country and in the Muslim world at large;
this dichotomy plays a crucial role in the discussion on factors that in-
fluence the relationship between sharia and national law. The points of
departure of both ‘camps’ are explained in 1.5. Going beyond this di-
chotomy, the study will show that the ideological-religious spectrum is
influenced by a number of other (f)actors adding to the complexity of
the picture.
The sixth perspective is normative pluralism. It positions sharia as
one of the normative systems that have had an impact on the people
and states in the Muslim world. It is a fact that customary law, colonial
law, foreign law, and international law, including human rights law,
have also exerted significant influence on the development of national
law and local legal practices until this very day (see 14.5).
This multiplicity of frames allows the book to be used for several pur-
poses and by various readerships. The study enables country-by-country
comparison, whilst at the same time all periods, governance contexts,
areas of law, concerns and issues can be compared. In addition, the
book may help in developing a realistic overview of the problem as a
whole. It strives to appeal to students of law, of history, of governance,
and of Islamic studies. It also aims at informing decision-makers and
observers in the field of foreign policy and international relations, for
whom our assessments of the (in)compatibility of sharia-based law with
the rule of law, including human rights, may be useful. And finally, it
may serve to counterbalance the image of sharia as depicted by the
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constant stream of media reports and the alarmist responses which are
mentioned in the preface of this book. Perhaps reading this book will
help to put things in perspective.
Approaches chosen
The focus of this book lies on the contemporary legal systems of twelve,
predominantly developing countries with clear Muslim majorities.2 The
book certainly does not pretend to be a major book about sharia as
such. There are excellent works by renowned authors such as Hallaq
(2009), Vikør (2005), or the earlier generation of Coulson (1964) and
Schacht (1964), who focus on sharia – or Islamic law – itself. They do
so mostly from a historical perspective, usually dealing with recent de-
velopments only briefly at the beginning or end of their studies. They
explore the issues of the formation and theory of sharia, its methodolo-
gies, and its prescriptions, in great detail. There is also a rich selection
of literature about particular aspects of sharia, on Islam and constitu-
tional law, Islam and human rights, the status of women and family
law in the Arab world, Islamic criminal law, Islamic courts, etc.
In contrast, this book looks at the processes of incorporation of sharia
in national legal systems from a socio-legal perspective. This means that
the authors do not only describe the contents of the law, but also try to
shed light on the formation and functioning of law in context. One of
the strong points of socio-legal scholarship is its capacity to distinguish
law from social reality, ‘law in the books’ from ‘law in action’, text from
context. This is important because it is precisely in this border area that
confusion and contestation about sharia have often originated.
As for the historical parts of the respective country chapters, the
authors have identified longitudinal and recent trends. In the sections
about recent history (1985 to the present) they pay particular attention
to governance contexts, facilitating our understanding of why actors
made certain decisions. Thus we have looked at law as a reflection of
political and social forces and values that have evolved over time in par-
ticular societies.
The study’s focus on national laws raises questions about its rele-
vance, such as: Do these laws really matter to ordinary people? How do
these laws relate to the local social realities of justice seekers? Several of
the chapters refer to studies in legal anthropology about the interaction
between citizens and legal institutions. I regret that the scope of this
project did not allow more space to the authors, some of whom are in-
deed social and legal anthropologists, to go down to the grassroots level
and present local case studies. Still, you may notice that much of their
writing is informed by first-hand knowledge of local developments. In
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this way, the book tries to link law not only to history and governance,
but also to society at large.
The term ‘Muslim countries’ in this book is used merely to describe
the setting. It does not imply any social, political, or legal characteristic,
and has no explanatory value. The term ‘developing countries’ is more
important in this respect. The countries in this book are often societies
that face serious development problems. Not only do many developing
countries suffer from insecurity, economic stagnation, poverty, injustice,
and a lack of quality education and proper health care, they also see
first-hand that their traditional rural societies are falling apart in the
face of rapid urbanisation. Breakdown of social control in such transi-
tional societies has led to a rise of social ills common in almost every
country in the world – crime, prostitution, drug abuse, drinking. Often
socio-political conditions are not conducive for national law and govern-
ance to take over the full and effective regulation of society. Corruption,
lack of resources, and other inefficiencies appear to be endemic.
The approach taken in this study fits within the academic domain
that addresses the formation and functioning of legal systems of devel-
oping countries and their contributions to governance and develop-
ment, which at a number of universities worldwide is now called Law,
Governance, and Development (LGD) studies. The impetus for the
study at hand stems from that intellectual tradition. LGD studies have
their roots partly in the studies of colonial law and postcolonial law.
Generally, LGD studies is regarded as part of the broader category of so-
cio-legal studies, which combines the study of law with the legal specia-
lisations of other disciplines.3
Many LGD case studies have drawn gloomy conclusions about the ef-
fectiveness of national law in Asia, Africa and Latin America, about in-
justices and the lack of ‘real legal certainty’. Explanations often refer to
the colonial heritage of legal pluralism, the imbalance of political power,
uneven economic conditions, and/or legal and institutional weaknesses.
These explanations differ considerably from an approach, which mainly
points at the islamisation of law as the root cause of injustice and fail-
ing legal systems in the Muslim world. Such approach has become
fashionable among some islamologists and philosophers, who consider
Koranic verses as the unchangeable, uniform, normative essence of
Muslim thought and behaviour. In contrast, socio-legal scholars focus-
ing on the interaction between law and social context, are prepared to
observe change, and diversity, both in legal texts as well as in social
practices.
22 JAN MICHIEL OTTO
1.2 Sharia incorporated
Conceptualisation of sharia and Islamic law
This book will often refer to the term ‘sharia’. Like its counterpart
‘Islamic law’ the term ‘sharia’ is surrounded with confusion between
theory and practice, between theological and legal meanings, between
internal and external perspectives, and between past and present
manifestations.
According to Islamic jurisprudence, theology and historiography, the
rules of sharia are based on the revelation by God of his plan for man-
kind to the Prophet Muhammad until his death in 632 (Vikør 2005:
20). In order to interpret God’s will from the available sources, religious
scholars developed Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) from the eighth century
onwards. The scholars (ulama) put God’s revelation into effect, drafting
a scientific, legal corpus of behavioural rules. Notably, in the first two
centuries numerous scholarly fiqh-books were filled with case studies
and rules. From the outset, many differences of opinion cropped up,
for example disagreements over the sources of sharia, its unchanging
character, its scope, and its validity ‘as law’. Some of the authors, such
as Al-Hanafi, Al-Maliki, Al-Shafi'i and Al-Hanbali gained great influ-
ence. Their names were given to different fiqh-schools, which came to
represent ‘the dominant opinions’ of what we may call ‘classical’ sharia,
especially since two centuries later Muhammad’s ‘gate to free interpre-
tation (ijtihad) was closed’.4
The profession of the Muslim scholars who, thus, studied and devel-
oped the sharia, has always been a mixture of what we nowadays would
call theologians and jurists. In Arabic those among the ulama, who spe-
cialise in Islamic jurisprudence are referred to as faqih (plur. fuqaha, ex-
pert of fiqh, jurist, or ‘legal’ scholar). They may work as a scholar and
teacher in a seminary, as a mufti (the one who issues fatwas or legal opi-
nions about what rule of sharia applies to a particular case) or as a
judge (qadi).5 The broader category of ulama, is usually translated as ‘re-
ligious scholars’, or just ‘scholars’. While in this book different authors
use all of these terms sometimes in different ways, in the introduction
and conclusion of this book I will refer to the ulama as ‘scholars’.
Islamic law has often been said to be a law of scholars, as opposed to ci-
vil or continental law, which is often regarded as law-maker’s law, and
common law, which is supposedly judge-made.
It has been the perennial objective of Islamic scholars to discover and
develop ‘the sharia’ as a concrete body of rules and principles.
Common people used to consult the scholars, asking them what ‘the
sharia’ would prescribe in a particular case. Meanwhile, the many
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differences in interpretation between, for example, Sunnis and Shiis,
and between the different schools of law, are obvious. Scholars who stu-
died Islamic jurisprudence have explained the diversity as a result of its
open, discursive character, which should help to bridge the gap between
the divine abstract source and the variety of human behaviours and con-
texts to which it should apply. There seems to be agreement among
modern scholars about the very diversity of sharia itself. Vikør (2005: 1)
states in the introduction to his history of Islamic law:
There is no such thing as a, that is one, Islamic law, a text that
clearly and unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s
behaviour. There is a great divergence of views, not just between
opposing currents, but also between individual scholars within
the legal currents, of exactly what rules belong to Islamic law.
The jurists have had to learn to live with this disagreement on
and variety in the contents of the law.
Likewise, another scholar of Islamic law, Peters (1997: 260) wonders if
sharia is a legal system at all ‘[…] because such a diversity of opinions
exists next to one another [and] [e]ven within the schools of law there
are often differences of opinion’. The rules of sharia are not unambigu-
ously laid down in the law, but rather they are formulated in scholarly
explorations or, as Peters states, ‘in a continuous debate with their pre-
decessors and colleagues’ (ibid: 260, translation by JMO). Fuller (2003:
57), a senior political observer, for instance, states:
There is no one Sharia but rather many different, even contest-
ing ways to build a legal structure in accordance with God’s vi-
sion for mankind. A single Sharia doesn’t exist. It is not a book
that one can purchase. It is shaped, and interpreted by humans’
differing understanding of what the Qur’an and the Prophet’s
life and experience mean.
Yet, we face the problem that many people – from ‘puritan’ Islamists to
their Western critics – continue to assume and propagate that the sharia
is a uniform thing, a fixed set of norms that is binding upon all
Muslims, regardless of where they live, and which cannot be moder-
nised, because it is ‘divine and unchangeable’. Indeed, many nations,
groups, and individuals use the term sharia to present their interpreta-
tion as the definitive divine law. How then can this idea of a fixed, un-
changeable sharia, deriving from Islamic theology, be consonant with
the social reality of widely diverging interpretations of sharia, or, as
Fuller and others suggest, of a diversity of ‘sharia’s’? A realistic solution
starts with the acknowledgment that the manifold ways in which law-
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makers, judges, religious scholars, academics, and others refer to the
sharia, should be analysed and categorised. In the course of this project
it has proven useful to discern four distinct ways in which the term
sharia is used, namely as divine abstract sharia, as classical sharia, as
historically transferred sharia, and as contemporary sharia.
First, divine, abstract sharia: this is God’s plan for mankind and as
such contains the rules for good order and human behaviour that
should guide his religious community. The existence of this divine, ab-
stract sharia is accepted as a fact by all devout Muslims, ‘moderate’ or
‘puritan’ (see 1.5). Before it can be applied in practice it needs explana-
tion and elaboration by scholars. Al-Azmeh (1993: 12) has considered
the implications of this abstract meaning of sharia for the debates sur-
rounding islamisation of law, noting that:
Islamic law is not a code. This is why the frequently heard call
for its ‘application’ is meaningless, most particularly when calls
are made for the application of sharia – this last term does not
designate law, but is a general term designating good order,
much like nomos or dharma […].
Secondly, classical sharia: this is the corpus of rules, principles, and
cases that were drawn up by fiqh-scholars in the first two centuries after
the Prophet Muhammad. Sharia, in this sense, is concrete and refers to
the classical writings of leading scholars and the early commentaries on
them. As such, classical sharia necessarily bears the traces of how reli-
gion, society, and politics were experienced in particular parts of the
world more than a millennium ago.
Thirdly, historically transferred sharia: this includes the whole body of
interpretations developed and transmitted throughout a history of more
than a 1,000 years across the Muslim world, from the alleged closure of
the gate of free interpretation to its reopening in the nineteenth century,
and up to the present day. The notion of historically transferred sharia
encompasses an immense, full spectrum of considerations and ideolo-
gies – ranging from personal beliefs to state ideology, from living law to
formal positive law, from moderate to ‘puritan’ interpretations. While
classical sharia, as taught and interpreted by mainstream, conservative
religious scholars, has been the main point of reference in most
Muslim countries, certain modernist scholars have seen and seized op-
portunities for smaller and larger reforms of sharia. Usually, though
not always, they did so on the basis of the classical religious sources
and commentaries. This was especially so in the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries when many interpretations of the classical sharia were in-
troduced as reforms of the national legal systems of Muslim countries,
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including, for example, throughout the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt,
Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Lastly, contemporary sharia: this concept of sharia refers to the whole
of principles, rules, cases, and interpretations that are actually in use at
present throughout the Muslim world. Contemporary sharia has be-
come a vast, fragmented, and dispersed mass. Ideas travel ever faster
following domestic and international migration, the missionary (daqwa)
movements since the 1970s, and the use of journals, radio, television,
and the Internet. While governments, institutes of higher religious edu-
cation, and mass movements all promulgate and publish their own ver-
sions of sharia, individuals and study groups around the world seek
their own preferred scholars to instruct them about the prescriptions of
‘the sharia’.
Hopefully this fourfold distinction will help the reader, when coming
across the term sharia in this book, to understand from its context
which notion of sharia is actually meant. It may also help to recognise
those instances in which different meanings of sharia are conflated,
such as in the famous phrase ‘introducing the sharia’. Some authors,
also in this volume, use the term sharia mainly for the divine sharia,
which is abstract and general. They call the other three – all results of
human activity – fiqh.
Sharia incorporated
The title Sharia incorporated is meant to catch the essence of the twelve
stories that make up this book.6 In all Muslim countries of old sharia
has been regarded as a divine plan. To be applicable and practical, how-
ever, the principles and rules of sharia must be interpreted and laid
down. This has always raised vital questions, such as: Who will do this?
When and where? To what extent? How? And with what purpose? Will
there be a check on this power? What if people do not agree? Initially,
as indicated above, religious scholars performed this task, and often
with a considerable degree of autonomy from the rulers. That situation
has changed notably since the early nineteenth century, when the world
was gradually divided up into independent states.
States by definition consist of institutions that are supposed to have
the authority to make and enforce rules that govern their people. Their
internal and external sovereignty is a conditio sine qua non of their exis-
tence. Therefore, states can in principle not accept the existence of a
parallel structure with similar objectives, unless it can be incorporated
in the structures and laws of that state itself. This is exactly what we
have seen happening with sharia.
Intermediate stages of incorporation occurred as long as Muslim ter-
ritories formed part of colonial empires – or the Ottoman empire for
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that matter – during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After
independence, which came to the Muslim states in three big waves, in
the 1920s, the 1940s, and the 1960s (see 14.2), the new political elites
had to decide how religion should be embodied in ideology, policy, and
law. Suddenly nationalist leaders and religious leaders, who had fought
side by side in the struggle for independence, became opponents. For
in all Muslim countries the new political elite of independent states
opted for supremacy of their own authority, their own decrees, their
own national laws. That was the new rule of the game, and it would not
change. All other normative systems and the traditional elite were to be
incorporated into the state’s legal, political, and administrative systems.
As such, state interference with sharia became broad and deep. Political
and legal marginalisation became the fate of both sharia as well as of
the class of scholar-jurists, who had developed and applied it.
As you will read in the following chapters, the modalities of incor-
poration differed hugely. The kings of Saudi Arabia, who have always
had to rely on support of the powerful religious elite of Wahhabi scho-
lars, proclaimed the Quran and the Sunna to be the country’s ‘constitu-
tion’, and as such denied that name to the ‘basic law’ that spells out the
organisation of that state. They gave the Wahhabi scholars important
positions and powerful voices within the state legal and political system.
To the contrary, the new elite under Atatürk removed sharia from the
Turkish legal system and kept tight control on religion through the
Diyanet, the state office for religious affairs. The King of Morocco be-
came ‘commander of the faithful’ and had a decisive voice in how
sharia-based law would be codified in family legislation. The govern-
ment of Egypt accepted in its constitution the principles of sharia to be
‘the source of legislation’, but ultimately decided not to adopt its sub-
stantive criminal law, and to modernise its family law. In Iran, the Shah
failed to recognise the political power of the scholars in his country;
upon the overthrow of his regime, Khomeini and his clerical associates
became the new political elite who could incorporate their views in state
policies and national law.
A consistent fact in all twelve national laws except for secular Turkey
is that sharia has been incorporated in the state system, often adapting
old interpretations of sharia to socio-economic changes. Although criti-
cised and contested by many different – if not all – sides, the incorpora-
tion of sharia by the state remains essentially a fact of life. About this
incorporation different political camps use different discourses to
further their goals. So it is not uncommon to see that certain acts of in-
corporation are regarded as islamisation of national law by one camp
and as annexation of sharia by the state by another (see 1.5).
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1.3 Countries, concerns, and contested issues
Selecting twelve Muslim countries
In order to have a fair representation of the Muslim world, twelve
Muslim majority countries were selected. These twelve countries repre-
sent about two thirds of the world’s total Muslim population of 1.5 bil-
lion (see table 1 below). Most Muslims live in South and Southeast
Asia, and a considerable number live in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study
includes countries from those regions, thus avoiding the common ten-
dency of equating the Muslim world with the Arab world or the Middle
East. The selected countries include five countries from the Middle East
and North Africa (Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey),
three from Central and South Asia (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan), two
from Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia) and two from West Africa
(Mali and Nigeria). The politico-legal orientation of the governments of
these countries ranges from ‘puritan’ to ‘moderate’ to ‘secularist’. They
vary in size of their population, percentage of Muslims, their social and
economic development, their security situation, the degree of democra-
tisation, and their political stability.
For the purposes of this study, a ‘Muslim country’ is understood to be a
country of which at least 55 per cent of the population is Muslim. The
international organisation of Muslim countries, the Organisation of the
Islamic Conference, has 57 member states. Of these, 41 or roughly
three quarters meet the above-mentioned definition. The fourth quarter
is made up of member states with Muslim minorities. For a long time
Malaysia was considered a borderline case at 55 per cent, but this num-
ber is now commonly estimated at 60 per cent. Strictly speaking,
Table 1 Twelve countries by number of inhabitants, % Muslims
Country Inhabitants (Mln.) Muslims (%)
Egypt 80,3 90
Morocco 33,8 99
Saudi Arabia 28,0 100
Sudan 41,0 70
Turkey 71,2 100
Afghanistan 31,9 99
Iran 70,0 98
Pakistan 174,0 97
Indonesia 234,7 86
Malaysia 24,8 60
Mali 12,6 90
Nigeria 140,0 50
Source: Bartleby: http://www.bartelby.com/151/indexes/countries/1.html, accessed March 2010
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Nigeria, with a Muslim population of only about 50 per cent, does not
meet our definition of a Muslim country. However, the size and impor-
tance of the country – and the ramifications of the programmes of sha-
ria implementation recently undertaken in twelve of its Northern states
– led to the decision to include Nigeria in this study.
Main concerns, contested issues, common assumptions, and questions
There are four main concerns that have arisen as a consequence of the
islamisation of law:
(i) Supremacy of sharia
(ii) Legal status of women
(iii) Cruel corporal punishments
(iv) Violations of human rights
The book’s preface refers to the post 9/11 context in which these con-
cerns took centre stage, namely heated domestic and international de-
bates and strongly conflicting ideas on Islam, and especially sharia. To
Muslim ‘puritans’, embracing the sharia has always seemed the very
best thing that they themselves and their country could do. Muslim
‘moderates’ have held different views both of the role of sharia in state
and society and of how sharia should be interpreted; but being
Muslims, they have of course not been opposed to sharia as such. For
many people in the West, however, sharia started symbolising the main
foreign threat to their society. Among those alarmed, vocal academics,
politicians, and other opinion leaders embarked on a more confronta-
tional course.
For years the abovementioned concerns were constantly brought to
public attention, and the sensitised media were able to report almost
daily on worrisome issues from the Muslim world – topics ranging
from the prosecution of Baha’i in Egypt, to the rise of a ‘puritan’
Muslim party in Morocco, to honour killings in Turkey, to the hanging
of young homosexuals in Iran, to violent attacks in Pakistan, or to pub-
lic flogging in Aceh, Indonesia. Most of the headlines covered a specific
issue that seemed to fit well within one of the four main concerns men-
tioned above. For the purpose of systematic analysis, I have listed those
worrisome issues and added the alarmist assumptions that since a few
years have become so common in the West.
Supremacy of sharia
Within this first area of concern, the following issues can be
distinguished:
– Scope. This issue concerns the extent to which sharia influences a
national legal system as a whole. Many assume that in Muslim
INTRODUCTION 29
countries sharia has pervaded all areas of public law and private
law.
– Territory. This issue involves the geographical spread of particular
sharia-based laws within a particular country. It is often assumed
that islamisation of the law in a specific district or province repre-
sents a wider change and spread throughout the whole country.
– Orientation. This issue touches on which of the competing views
and movements within the Muslim world is actually dominant,
especially in interpretations of sharia. Many assume that islamisa-
tion of law automatically implies the supremacy of ‘puritan’ views,
rather than ‘moderate’ perspectives.
– Basic norm. This begs the question as to whether the foundational
norm of a country’s legal system is the constitution itself – as op-
posed to ‘the sharia’ or ‘Islam’ – if particular provisions in the con-
stitution state that sharia is the main source of legislation or that
every law should comply with the tenets of Islam. It is often as-
sumed that an increasing number of constitutions have actually in-
troduced sharia as their highest or basic norm.
– Legal decision makers. This issue is about who ultimately decides the
rules in a legal system: religious scholars, who are experts of the
fiqh? Or the office holders and officials of the state, such as elected
parliamentarians, administrators and bureaucrats, and professional
judges trained in national, largely secular, law. Many assume that
sharia-based legal systems are theocracies that leave decisions in
law-making, interpretation, and adjudication to religious scholars
trained in Islamic religious institutions rather than to professional
policy-makers and jurists trained in secular universities.
Consequently, law enforcement in these systems is assumed to be
entrusted to a religion-based sharia police.
– Islamic codification. The issue is whether the existing law codes,
which were often based on Western models, have been thrown over-
board completely and replaced by fully Islamic codes. It is often as-
sumed that Western law codes have indeed been replaced by new
Islamic codes that are totally different.
– Islamic courts. The issue is whether states have established separate
Islamic judiciaries that have taken on the functions of secular state
courts. A popular assumption is that Islamic courts have indeed
been established or entrusted with increased powers.
– Islamic ruler. The issue involves the conception of an Islamic gov-
ernment as essentially authoritarian, without powerful elected par-
liaments or independent courts capable of maintaining a check on
the powers of the ruler or head of state. Many assume that heads of
the executive power possess vast legal authority derived from sharia,
and without any democratic constraints.
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Most of these eight issues are addressed in a country’s constitutional
law.
Legal status of women
Within this second area of concern we selected the following issues.
– Repudiation (casting off). The question is whether a man’s right, be-
stowed upon him by classical sharia, to repudiate his wife at will,
unilaterally, and without having to give any reason, is still valid. It
is often assumed that husbands can indeed divorce their wives arbi-
trarily by unilateral declaration without judicial or governmental
approval.
– Polygamy. This issue involves the right of a man, as provided for by
classical sharia, to conclude multiple marriages with up to four wi-
ves, as he likes and without the need for permission of the first wife
or of state authorities. Many assume that Muslim men can marry
up to four wives at will.
– Divorce. This issue concerns the possibilities for a woman to obtain
a divorce from a court, which according to classical sharia are very
limited. A common opinion is that a woman can hardly initiate a
divorce.
– Inheritance. The issue is that classical sharia provides that in the
case of inheritance a female heir inherits half of what a male heir
in a similar position would inherit. It is generally assumed that a
woman indeed inherits only half of the portion of a man.
These four issues are addressed in a country’s personal status, family,
and inheritance law.
Cruel corporal punishments
In this third area of concern, cruel corporal punishments, the most pro-
minent issues are threefold:
– Hadd offences. This issue involves the enactment of five, and in
some countries six, criminal provisions, based on classical sharia,
that prescribe heavy corporal punishments for specific crimes,
namely extramarital sex (zina), accusation of extramarital sex, rob-
bery, theft, consumption of alcohol, and, according to some schools
of thought, apostasy. Many assume such provisions have indeed
been enacted.
– Execution of corporal punishments. The issue is whether it is common
practice to actually administer corporal punishments, such as ston-
ing and amputation. It is readily assumed that these barbaric pun-
ishments are regularly executed throughout the Muslim world.
– Retribution and blood money. This issue involves the enactment of
criminal provisions, based on classical sharia, that entail the
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retribution (qisas) of violent offences, such as murder, manslaugh-
ter, and assault, according to the principle of an ‘eye for an eye’;
and that retribution can also be bought off with ‘blood money’
(diyya). It is generally assumed that retaliation provisions are com-
mon and applied in practice.
These three issues are addressed in a country’s criminal law.
Violations of human rights
This fourth area of concern is different from those mentioned above in
that it departs from established normative standards – those of interna-
tional human rights treaties with universal objectives –, and refers to in-
stitutional mechanisms for identification and condemnation of viola-
tions. It includes the abovementioned concern with women’s legal sta-
tus by reference to the right to freedom from discrimination, enacted in
the international Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). It also encompasses the
right to physical and mental integrity, which is guaranteed by the inter-
national Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). This area of concern is
thus broader and addresses all areas of law. For the purpose of this
study four issues are selected.
– Freedom from discrimination. The issue is that besides the discrimi-
nation of women in family and inheritance law, sharia-based law
also discriminates against several other groups, including homosex-
uals, non-Muslims, ‘deviant’ Muslims, adherents of other religions,
and atheists. The assumption is that such discriminatory provisions
have indeed been enacted, and as such make life for minority
groups difficult, or even impossible.
– Freedom of religion. The issue is the Islamic prohibition against leav-
ing one’s faith, which constitutes the crime of apostasy and is pun-
ishable under classical sharia law with heavy penalties, allegedly
even in some circumstances the death penalty. It is commonly as-
sumed that criminalisation of apostasy violates the freedom of reli-
gion for Muslims.
– Other prohibitions of and prescriptions for (un)Islamic behaviour. This
issue relates to the legal obligation to refer to Islam, its prescrip-
tions, and its symbols with deep respect only – for women to wear
the veil, for Muslims to refrain from music and dance, and for com-
pulsory education in Islamic scriptures. Many assume that such
provisions are often enacted and in practice encroach upon funda-
mental freedoms.
– Adherence to international human rights law. The issue is whether
Muslim countries have accessed, ratified, and implemented the
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major human rights treaties. It is often assumed that Muslim coun-
tries are not bound by such human rights treaties, and that they
have not established national human rights laws and institutions to
promote human rights domestically.
Economy and finance
Each of the twelve country studies in this book pays attention to most
of the abovementioned concerns and issues. In addition, they briefly
touch on sharia-based law in the sphere of economy and finance. Such
law, it is assumed, includes a ban on Islamic banks to charge interest.
Muslims must also pay special religious taxes to religious authorities,
symbolising their adherence to religious, rather than worldly, authori-
ties. As there is no direct connection with the violation of any human
right, this aspect has led to minimal, if any, Western concerns and criti-
cisms in the international debates on sharia and the rule of law. To the
contrary, Western banks, law firms, and governments have taken a keen
interest in Islamic banking.
Monitoring the islamisation of law
The abovementioned issues, totalling about twenty, constitute a useful
set for monitoring the impact of islamisation on national legal systems.
The selection of issues remains contestable, but by and large this set
may serve as a fair representation of the issues that have dominated do-
mestic and international debates about Islam and sharia. For the
authors of the country studies, each issue was an open question, to
which a verifiable answer had to be found. By aggregating the outcomes
of the twelve country studies, this research project has obtained a rich
set of data that enables a systematic comparative overview of legal provi-
sions. If we also take into account the historical and socio-political back-
ground of legal change on these issues, we may begin to grasp a better
understanding of the changing relationship between sharia and national
law in the Muslim world.
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1.4 National legal systems, three delicate areas of law
Composition of national legal systems
At first glance most developing countries seem to have national legal
systems set up like that of any more developed country. The term ‘na-
tional legal system’ here refers to the whole body of legal rules, legal in-
stitutions, and legal processes. Developing countries have laws on any
conceivable topic, many of which closely resemble the laws of developed
countries. They also have much the same legal institutions, such as leg-
islatures at central and regional levels, ministries, executive agencies,
regional and local governments, supreme courts, appeal courts and
courts of first instance, ombudsman institutions, bar associations, law
faculties, legal aid institutions, etc. As most Muslim countries fall in
the category of developing countries, the main set up of their laws and
legal institutions is not different from that of any other country.
A closer look at the structure of legal systems of developing coun-
tries, however, reveals layers and fragmentation. Under the surface of
the more visible present-day national laws, we find layers of legal provi-
sions and ideologies deriving from, for example, the socialist, authori-
tarian era of the 1960s and 1970s, of colonial law, of religious law, and
of tribal customary law. The ‘geo-legal’ structure of a country, though, is
far from uniform. Customary law, for example, may apply in one place,
for one group, or for one particular topic, while elsewhere, for other
parties or a different topic, religious law or a national law may apply in-
stead of the customary law applied elsewhere. The layers of law differ
in territorial scope, in subject matter, and in institutional set-up.
Customary law is strong in rural areas, and often concerned with dis-
pute settlement, land law, inheritance law, and in many regions with fa-
mily law. Its key actors are traditional authorities, i.e. chiefs and tradi-
tional councils. In most Muslim countries Islamic law has a particularly
strong impact on family and inheritance law. Since colonial law used to
recognise the indigenous law as ‘law of the natives’, it gave rise to the
formal incorporation of customary and religious courts in the judiciary.
After independence, most young states wanted to assert full control
over the law of their subjects. Rather than maintaining the colonial le-
gacy they strived for unification of their legal systems. And indeed,
most developing countries have developed an impressive amount of na-
tional laws and established the relevant national legal institutions to im-
plement these laws. In comparison to the staggering numbers of mod-
ern national laws and regulations, the hard kernel of sharia rules over
which actual agreement exists, is rather miniscule. Yet, in the same way
as customary law, sharia has continued to play a role until today, as we
shall see in the country studies.
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The inheritance of colonial law also consists of codifications of civil
and criminal law, of jurisprudence, of laws of procedure, of types of ju-
dicial organisation, of legal styles and ways of legal reasoning, legal edu-
cation, and legal language adopted primarily from European models.
The colonial legal traditions have been carried on in developing coun-
tries by legal professions and scholarship. Former British colonies like
Nigeria, Pakistan, and Malaysia are now members of the
Commonwealth and still exchange legal information with other
Commonwealth countries. Former French colonies – e.g. Morocco and
Mali – are still oriented towards French legal development and legal in-
formation. Remarkably, French law has also been a major reference for
the codifications of Egypt, Iran, and Afghanistan, even though they
were never colonised. Egyptian law, especially its civil code, has had a
major impact throughout the Middle East, from the Gulf States to
Afghanistan. In contrast, Turkish civil law has largely been based on the
Swiss Civil Code. Thus, different ‘centers of radiation’, to use the con-
cept of Arminjon’s work on comparative law, have influenced the legal
systems of developing countries, including those which form part of
the Muslim world (Arminjon, Nolde & Wolf: 1952). Table 2 (see below)
provides some basic information about the centers of radiation influen-
cing the twelve legal systems under review, such as their constitution,
colonial legal tradition, school of Islamic jurisprudence, and the role of
customary law.
Today, domestic laws are increasingly influenced by public interna-
tional law. International organisations like the WTO, ILO, FAO, WHO,
IMF, World Bank, and UNDP provide advice on domestic legal drafts.
Financial aid is often made conditional upon the adoption of law re-
form. Human rights conventions and movements have also prompted
legal change. Competition between developing countries for foreign di-
rect investment has been another driving force behind emulating the
laws of ‘successful’ countries. While this enumeration of centres of ra-
diation is far from complete, it is clear that law-makers in developing
countries have been drawing from various domestic, foreign, interna-
tional, and transnational sources in their efforts to achieve national pol-
icy objectives.
Dysfunctions of legal systems
Whatever sources have been used in the formation of the laws of devel-
oping countries, and whether they include versions of sharia or not, it
is common knowledge that the actual operation of these legal systems
is marked by serious dysfunctions and shortcomings. Many legal sys-
tems simply fail to fulfil what is their main task, namely providing jus-
tice and legal certainty for all.
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Table 2 Twelve national legal systems with their legal traditions
Country Year of independence Year of present constitution/
last amendments
Colony/
Protectorate
Legal tradition
Civil law/
Common law
Fiqh
tradition
Scope of customary law
(1: small; 2: moderate; 3: vast)
Egypt 1922 19711 Ottoman,
Britain
Civil law Hanafi 1
Morocco 1956 1996 France Civil law Maliki 2
Saudi Arabia 1932 - 2 - - Hanbali 1
Sudan 1956 20053 Britain Civil/ Common law Hanafi 3
Turkey 1923 19824 - Civil -
Afghanistan 1919 2004 (Britain) Civil law Hanafi/Shia 3
Iran -5 1979 - Civil law Shia 2
Pakistan 1947 19736 Britain Common law Hanafi 3
Indonesia 1945 19457 Netherlands Civil law Shafi i 2
Malaysia 1957 19578 Britain Common law Shafi i 2
Mali 1960 1992 France Civil law Maliki 3
Nigeria 1960 1999 Britain Common law Maliki 3
1 Several important amendments were incorporated, notably in 1980, 2005 and 2007.
2 According to the Basic Ordinance (1992) the country’s divine sources of Islamic law form its constitution.
3 This is an Interim Constitution for a five years period, after which South Sudan will decide about its future.
4 The constitution was last amended in 2004
5 The history of independent Iran goes back thousands of years.
6 Many amendments were incorporated.
7 Since 1998 four important amendments have strengthened the rule of law considerably.
8 Since 1957 hundreds of amendments were enacted.
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This lack of justice and legal certainty can in part be attributed to le-
gal causes, such as the inadequacy of laws, restricted or faulty legal
mandates of institutions, and incomplete or vaguely construed legal
procedures. In addition, the dysfunctions are closely related to other,
non-legal problems of development and governance, such as insecurity,
poverty, illiteracy, authoritarianism, and corruption. Curing the pro-
blems of legal systems, therefore, presupposes progress in other areas.
The plurality, fragmentation, and overlapping of normative systems in
most developing countries add to the problematic nature of governance
and law. It would require much imagination to see how the general
Islamist recipe – ‘introduction of the sharia’ – can provide a practically
feasible way out of these complex problems. Meanwhile, the common
objective and direction to which most countries have subscribed is the
‘rule of law’. This has become an appealing concept because it reflects
the ideal of justice, which underlies all ideologies, religions, and nation-
states, and it also provides for an elaborate set of legal and institutional
standards with practical guidance.
Rule of law and human rights: authoritative standards?
Rule of law has become the most common international umbrella con-
cept prescribing normative standards for legal systems (Tamanaha
2004). International donor policies have made good governance and
the rule of law a focal point of their assistance to developing countries
(Carothers 2003). Meanwhile, there has been much debate about the
clash, as Huntington phrased it, between the ‘Western’ concept of the
rule of law and Islamic concepts of law, or more specifically about the
compatibility of sharia with human rights. But what does the rule of
law mean, how Western is this concept, and how does it relate to hu-
man rights? Bedner (2010) has concluded on the basis of an extensive
literature review that the rule of law concept can be best understood by
distinguishing two complementary sets of standards, namely procedural
and substantive standards, as well as a third set regarding what he calls
‘control mechanisms’.
The main procedural standards of the rule of law, as accepted in
authoritative documents and academic literature, are that (a) state poli-
cies must employ written laws – acts, ordinances, decisions – as major
instruments; (b) all state actions must be subject to law; (c) the law
must be clear and consistent in substance, accessible and predictable
for citizens, and general in its application; and (d) the substance of the
law and its effectuation must be influenced by citizen approval.
As for the main substantive standards of the rule of law, there is con-
sensus that all laws and their interpretations must be subject to (a) fun-
damental principles of justice; and (b) human rights and freedoms of
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individuals, notably civil and political rights, social and economic rights,
and group rights.
In order to control compliance with these procedural and substantive
principles, the rule of law, as Bedner has proposed, also requires a third
set of elements to be in place, namely of control mechanisms: (a) the ex-
ecutive arm of the state must establish internal correction mechanisms on
unlawful administrative actions; (b) an independent judiciary, accessible
for every citizen, must be responsible for conflict resolution through inter-
pretation and application of the law; and (c) complementary quasi-judicial
institutions, such as an ombudsman, a national human rights-institution,
and various tribunals, must be in place to further ensure compliance with
the rule of law.
Over the last few decades the legal systems of the world have un-
doubtedly moved towards this rule of law. Yet, while country A’s legal
system may have succeeded in complying with most rule of law stan-
dards, it can still violate certain human rights. In the case of a Muslim
country, such violation may stem from its adherence to certain interpre-
tations of sharia. ‘Puritan’ regimes will as a matter of principle refuse
to formally review provisions of the divine sharia against secular legal
standards, but instead prescribe a reverse testing. ‘Moderate’ regimes
rather tend to accept the rule of law to be the dominant standard for
most practical purposes. In fact, both camps can agree about most of
the abovementioned elements of the rule of law, since there is no con-
flict with any sharia provision. Yet, certain human rights standards are
contested by puritans time and again as being ‘Western’ and ‘un-
Islamic’. From a human rights perspective, it is precisely the violation
of those standards that has given rise to the concerns and contested is-
sues listed above in 1.3. The recurring conflicts about those issues have
made certain parts of national law in the Muslim world rather thorny
and delicate, politically speaking. We find those delicate parts mostly in
constitutional, family, and criminal law. For this reason, the focus in
the legal sections of each country study is on these three areas of law
and their relationship to sharia in the country at hand.
1.5 Ideological-religious currents and discourses
The moderate-puritan dichotomy and beyond
Throughout the twentieth century different views were held across the
Muslim world about what should be the relationship between sharia
and national law. They ranged from Saudi Arabia’s preservation of clas-
sical sharia to Turkey’s strict secularism. Two discourses have fuelled
the interpretation and implementation of sharia more than any other,
namely those espoused by ‘puritans’ on the one hand, and by
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‘moderates’ on the other hand. Both believe, as Abou El Fadl explains,
‘in the oneness, completion and perfection of God’ and in his mercy
and compassion (Abou el Fadl 2007: 127-132). They also agree that God
should be approached by human beings ‘with submission, humility and
gratitude’. However, ‘puritans’ and ‘moderates’ differ dramatically in
their ideas about what God wants from human beings, how mankind
should use its ability to reason, and in particular about the role of sharia
in that relationship.
Moderate Muslims believe that in the moment of creation God has
entrusted humanity with a heavy responsibility, by providing human
beings with rationality and the ability to differentiate between right and
wrong. They should use this capacity to relentlessly strive to achieve
goodness, which includes justice, mercy, and compassion. Those are ac-
tually the real objectives of God’s law. As Abou El Fadl writes:
In moderate thought, God is too great to be embodied in a code
of law. The law helps Muslims in the quest for Godliness, but
Godliness cannot be equated to the law. […] the technicalities of
the law cannot be allowed to subvert the objectives of the law.
Therefore, if the application of the law produces injustice, suffer-
ing, and misery, this means that the law is not serving its pur-
poses […] then the law must be reinterpreted, suspended, or re-
constructed, depending on the law in question (ibid: 130-131).
In contrast, in the ‘puritan’ conception, good Muslims should be fearful
of God and study and obey his rules as strictly as possible. Whatever is
in the sacred sharia is thought to reflect God’s mercy and compassion.
So, what they need is a sharia which prescribes exact rules to which
they can submit by strict compliance. Through this only will they obtain
salvation:
Through meticulous obedience, Muslims will avoid punishment
in the Hereafter and will enter Heaven. […] By performing acts
of submission, Muslims earn good points, and by disobeying
God they earn sins (or bad points). In the Final Day, God will to-
tal up the good points and the sins. Heaven or Hell is deter-
mined by the balance of points […] (ibid: 127).
In the ‘puritan’ paradigm there are no grounds for legal reforms that
take contemporary socio-economic changes into account. In the ‘puri-
tan’ view:
The actual social impact that the law might have upon people is
considered irrelevant. Although people might feel that the law is
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harsh or that its application results in social suffering, this per-
ception is considered delusional (ibid: 128-129).
While the opposition between ‘moderates’ and ‘puritans’ has been a
constant throughout the history of Islam, contemporary politics and so-
cieties feature an ideological-religious spectrum which is in fact broader
and more complex than this dichotomy. Orientations of strategic
Islamic movements and groups range from nationalist, secularist, hu-
man rights, feminist, liberal, social services, clean government, moder-
nist, and democratic, to conservative, traditionalist, orthodox, pan-isla-
mist, radical, and ultimately, revolutionary, militant, and terrorist (cf.
Fuller 2003; Hallaq 2003). In practice, these orientations often overlap
and the meanings and connotations of the labels often differ. Political
positioning of such movements on religious issues often intersects with
other issues of domestic and foreign policy. Many of these movements
and groups are quite pragmatic and versatile, as power configurations
surrounding them are in constant flux and choices must be made be-
tween competing political discourses.
Major discourses about incorporation of sharia
Different political actors have voiced a variety of discourses on the in-
corporation of sharia. Governments have done their best to present the
incorporation as a deliberate policy that both demonstrates their respect
for religious beliefs among the people and provides them with state-
guaranteed legal certainty. According to this discourse the government
has opted for an incorporation that contributes to nation-building and
socio-economic progress, and is thus beneficial. While certain groups
may disagree with the outcome, the government has acted as an arbitra-
tor who, standing above the parties, has come up with the best possible
and most balanced solution. Often governments have ensured them-
selves of the support of high-ranking clerics, who have gone along with
this state discourse about the beneficial incorporation of sharia.
In contrast, Islamic scholars, who have not posited themselves as an
extension of the government, have presented the incorporation of sharia
as the political elite’s erroneous appropriation of the power to interpret
God’s will, to ascertain the rules of sharia, and to administer justice ac-
cordingly. This power used to be theirs. So, for them, the incorporation
of sharia constitutes a marginalisation of their profession and the dis-
tortion of a good thing that has now fallen into the wrong hands.
Academic expositions about the transformations of sharia often concur
with this narrative. Hallaq (2009) describes the fate of sharia as the re-
sult of a lost battle. He points to the fact that the political elites of the
independent Muslim countries have interfered much more broadly and
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deeper in religion in their societies than their colonial predecessors ever
dared. Feldman (2008) similarly depicts the scholars as the good ex-
perts of justice who used to exert a necessary and beneficial influence
on authoritarian rulers, until modern bureaucratic regimes chose to
sideline them and made a mess of what used to be a capable religious
administration of justice.
The disappointment of the scholars about their marginalisation by
the state is not shared by the ‘puritans’. In their discourse, the incor-
poration of sharia is the product of an essentially impious, amoral, and
opportunistic governance. They contend that rulers and scholars have
both failed to comply with God’s law; they have indulged in luxury and
corruption, neglected their real duties, and plunged their country into
misery. Incorporation of sharia, as it was conducted by such unfaithful
elites – lackeys of the West! – must be brought to an end so that revolu-
tionary Islamist forces can take over and promulgate new laws in full
accordance with God’s will.
While these are perhaps three of the leading discourses about incor-
poration of sharia in the Muslim world, the first two make themselves
seldom heard in the West, while the third has got through only to some
extent. In Europe and North America another discourse about this in-
corporation dominates all others, namely that which equates incorpora-
tion of sharia with islamisation of law, deterioration of human rights,
and a threat to both world peace and Western civilisation.
1.6 Towards a realistic history of sharia and national law
Selecting turning points and historical periods
The interaction between sharia and national legal systems has a long his-
tory, which has been depicted in the academic literature in different ways.
While Hallaq and Feldman have denounced the displacement of sharia
in modernising states, others such as Huntington and Marshall have em-
phasised the islamisation – if not rapid then ‘creeping’ – or ‘sharia-
isation’ of national law. The country studies in this book attempt a ba-
lanced interpretation of that history. Normally the history of each country
would deserve its own periodisation. However, for the purpose of com-
parison this study has used a common periodisation for all country
studies.
We have used the year 1800, the beginning of the nineteenth century,
as a starting point because it marks the start of major modernisations
in law and governance, both in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, as well
as in European colonies in Asia. Since Napoleon’s 1798 journey to
Egypt, the Middle East was suddenly confronted with European
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progress and modernity. In this period Islamic modernism emerged
and Muslim scholars ‘reopened the gate of free interpretation’.
The next turning point, 1920, was chosen since it marks the end of
the first World War, the subsequent end of the Ottoman Empire, and
the rise to independence of most Muslim countries in the Middle East.
What followed was a period of nationalism, state-building, and, espe-
cially after 1945, a rapid succession of ideologies and foreign influences.
Sharia as a normative system continuously had to face new political
contexts, from modernisation and liberalism during the interbellum to
socialism and authoritarianism in the 1950s and 1960s. Ambitious le-
gal policies of political elites were often informed by an urgent desire
for unification, modernisation, and secularisation and aimed for a
wholesale transformation of societies. The governments, however,
lacked the capacity to implement, and social resistance to the transfor-
mations turned out to be considerable (Allott 1980).
We have chosen 1965 as the starting point for the decline of this over-
ambitious nationalist, and often socialist and secular-oriented, rule in a
major part of the Muslim world. The heroic age of the first generation
of national leaders like Nasser and Sukarno was coming to an end.
African decolonisation was largely completed, and many of the young
Muslim countries in Asia and Africa went searching for their own ideol-
ogies and identities. Disappointed by broken promises of development
and the failures of governments, several countries experienced ideologi-
cal and power vacuums, which in countries, such as Iran, Pakistan, and
Sudan were filled by coups that brought islamisation of law and
governance.
As noted in the book’s preface, developments during the twenty-five
years after 1985 have been the subject of heated debates and specula-
tions about the islamisation of law. An important objective of the histor-
ical part of this study is to provide a balanced assessment of this pro-
cess in recent decades.
The histories of national legal systems in the chapters ahead start
mainly from around 1800. About the long period before 1800, the stu-
dies had to be brief. Yet, the preceding millennium was important as an
era that saw the growth and flourishing of sharia, as well as emerging
tensions with the laws of the state. Therefore, this section ends with a
brief introduction to that early period.
The millennium of sharia as the living law (c. 800-c. 1800)
In theory the legal system of the early, burgeoning Muslim state knew
only one lawgiver (God), one prevailing legal system (sharia), and one
type of judge (the qadi, who formed the single-headed sharia court).
Since 750, however, a parallel legal system under the Abbassid Caliph
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developed, serving practical and administrative needs (Esposito 1998:
22; Vikør 2005: 190). As rulers do, the Caliph made rules, issued de-
crees, and passed judgments himself. Formally, these decisions served
to carry out his main task, namely the preservation of sharia. The justi-
fication under sharia was that rulers were granted a discretionary
power, or siyasa. This power was seen as permissible – acknowledged
by the ulama – in so far as it did not conflict with the sharia (Esposito
1998: 23; Vikør 2005: 192).
A part of this parallel system under the Caliph, a sort of professional
administration of justice, was set up with boards of grievances or maza-
lim courts. Initially, these were only intended for complaints against
high government officials or judges, but gradually the Caliph broadened
the jurisdiction of the mazalim courts to include criminal, administra-
tive, and trade cases. In this way, the competence of the sharia courts
was reduced to family and inheritance law, religious endowments, and
in certain regions, perhaps also contract law. The mazalim courts were
not the only type of non-sharia courts that existed from the early days of
the caliphate. More important for most people were the police courts
(shurta courts), which operated as a separate system based on police in-
vestigations and which were ‘unhampered’ by the strict rules of evi-
dence prescribed by the sharia (Vikør 2005: 190-195). Thus, a dual sys-
tem of state law and religious law operated, theoretically unified by the
principle of siyasa. As most country chapters will reveal, customary law
prevailed in most rural areas, as a third important element.
From 1500, after centuries of stagnation, several Muslim princedoms
developed into expansive empires with considerable military power: the
Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and Southeast Europe, the Mughal
Empire on the Indian subcontinent, and the Shiite Safavid Empire in
Persia. As cultural capitals, Istanbul, Delhi, and Isfahan became worthy
successors to the Baghdad of the Abbasids (Esposito 1998: 26). In addi-
tion, the Ottoman sultan bore the religious title of Caliph. Islam pro-
vided the legitimation, the political ideology, and the law for the govern-
ing of the three large empires. Sharia was the official prevailing law in
all three. The actual scope of sharia courts, however, was usually limited
to family law and inheritance law. The sultans continued to issue their
own decrees and maintained the mazalim courts. Sometimes their prin-
cely edicts differed from classical sharia. In the fifteenth century, the
Ottoman sultan decreed that the strict hadd punishments were not to
be applied under his rule (see 6.1). In the three empires, the sultans
were virtually absolute rulers and were supported by vassals, civil ser-
vants, and military forces.
In opposition to this absolutist rule, the ulama tried to maintain their
own basis of power. In the Ottoman and Mughal empires this was done
through an implicit alliance with the ruler. In the Safavid Empire, the
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ulama maintained a more independent position, in accord with Shiite
doctrine. Certain ulama were active as judges, as state advisors, and for
the enforcement of the law. Above them, in addition to a chief judge,
was now also a chief religious functionary, known as the chief mufti, or
the Shaykh al-Islam (in the Ottoman Empire) or the Sadr al-sudir (in
Persia and South Asia). According to Hallaq (2003: 1710), the system of
Islamic religious scholars functioned as a counterweight to the state
and government, and ‘it did so with remarkable independence and suc-
cess.’ However, ‘the judge[s] who [were] appointed and paid by the state’
were soon suspected of being ‘agents of corrupt politics’. Other reli-
gious scholars or ulama were responsible for an expanded and often
flourishing educational system. Finally, they controlled a large number
of social services. The ulama often used the income from land grants
and religious endowments (waqf) for mosques, hospitals, schools, and
other public services. In this way, they acquired much authority among
the people, which strengthened their position vis-à-vis the secular
authority. Thus, Islam and sharia functioned for about a thousand years
in the Muslim world as a system of religion, governance, and law. As
Abou El Fadl writes:
The Shari’a […] functioned like the symbolic glue that held the
diverse Muslim nation together, despite its many different ethni-
cities, nationalities, and political entities. […] [T]he Shari’a re-
mained the transcendent symbol of unity, and the jurists [scho-
lars] were the Shari’a’s guardians [… and] stayed above the petty
political and military conflicts and […] provided the quintessen-
tial source of religious authority in the Muslim world (Abou El
Fadl 2007: 34).
Although practice was often different from the sacred doctrine, Islam,
nevertheless, furnished the people with a cohesive element and histori-
cal continuity. Rule according to sharia was the common element, as it
was also the minimum requirement for an Islamic government. The re-
cognition by the ruler that sharia was the official law preserved the
unity of the community and its Islamic character. Under the great sulta-
nates, Islamic law was thus ‘the criterion for the legitimacy of an
Islamic state’ (Esposito 1998: 31).
1.7 A voyage around the Muslim world
After this introduction it is now time to proceed to the country chapters,
embarking on our voyage around the Muslim world, which starts in
Egypt (see chapter 2), the ancient kingdom on the border of the two
continents Africa and Asia. Egypt, the largest country in the Arab world,
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has played a central role in the development of law in the Middle East.
During the nineteenth century, Egypt became one of the prime leaders
of modernisation in the region. Later, the country was to become the
centre of Islamic modernism inspired by Muhammad Abduh. The
country was also home to the great legal scholar Sanhuri, who managed
to draft a civil code during the interbellum on the basis of French law,
Egyptian case law, and sharia, which was to be introduced in over a doz-
en countries in the region. In 1980 a constitutional amendment de-
clared the principles of sharia to be the main source of legislation, but,
as we will see, this would not stop the liberalisation of marriage law.
From Egypt, we will move to the very Western corner of the Muslim
world, Morocco (see chapter 3). When the country became a French
Protectorate in 1912, the sultan agreed to seek French assistance for the
development of its legal system. Soon after independence in 1956,
Morocco introduced a codification of sharia, the Personal Status Code
of 1958. Having been amended several times, it now contains one of
the most progressive family laws in the Islamic world. During this pro-
cess, the king, who according to the constitution is ‘Commander of the
Faithful’, played an important role.
Like many Muslims do each year, we now set course for Saudi Arabia
(see chapter 4), where we find a different set of legal rules altogether.
Protecting the Holy Places where Islam originates from and hosting the
annual pilgrimage, Saudi Arabia, led by the ruling dynasty of the
Sauds, takes centre stage in the Muslim world. Sharia is its national
law, and law reform has been slower and more cautious than in any
other country. For decades, the powerful clan of the Wahhabi, which
sits in the country’s most powerful religious seats, has promoted mis-
sionaries all over the world to present the Wahhabite puritan model as
the only right one. Religious missions in Asia, Europe and Africa were
funded by profits made from the rich oil reserves.
Next we cross back over the Red Sea to Africa, to the Sudan (see
chapter 5). This state has been devastated by long lasting civil wars aris-
ing from the conflicts between the Islamic North, the non-Islamic
South, and later with rebel groups in Darfur. When in 1983 general
Numeiri had not succeeded in lifting his poor country into a higher
stage of socio-economic development, he announced a grand scale isla-
misation of the law. Since then, the Sudan has tried to ‘cleanse’ its legal
system of all traces of liberal British and Egyptian-French roots.
However, as part of the peace negotiations with the South in 1998 and
2005, relatively liberal constitutions were put back in place.
From the Sudan we continue into Turkey (see chapter 6), the country
that is considered by some as the bridge between Europe and the
Middle East – among the most populous countries in the Middle East,
like Egypt and Iran, and a country that has been steering its own
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ideological course for almost a century. Atatürk turned Turkey into a se-
cular nation after the end of the First World War, and to date it con-
tinues to be so. However, the rise of religious parties, such as the AK
led by Erdogan, has repeatedly led to tensions involving the army, the
police, and the judiciary. Perceived as symbol of religiosity, the issue of
the wearing of the veil has been the centre of tense political and legal
debate, perhaps more so than in any other country in the world.
Our journey continues into Afghanistan (see chapter 7) in Central
Asia. King Amanullah tried to reform this country at the same time
when and in the same way as Atatürk was busy reforming Turkey. Yet,
nation building in Afghanistan turned out to be a slow and difficult pro-
cess. Since the late 1970s, a large part of the country became the battle
field for tribal warlords, Russian troops, and Islamic resistance fighters.
The 1990s saw how the resistance forces were joined and overruled by
a new militant movement, established with support from the United
States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan: the Taliban. During their authoritar-
ian rule, the Taliban gave Osama bin Laden the opportunity to prepare
the infamous Twin Towers attack in 2001. After the subsequent
American invasion, the Taliban were expelled and foreign troops were
deployed to support the government in Kabul in hopes of maintaining
the rule of law in this poor and fragmented country.
If one crosses the border into Iran (see chapter 8), one arrives in a re-
latively organised and developed country. It is here that the Shah
launched his greatest modernisation policy, which only partially suc-
ceeded. In response to severe political repression, the Iranian people
supported the 1979 Islamic Revolution en masse. More than thirty years
after the Revolution, it may seem that the strong islamisation of the le-
gal system has barely, if at all, been toned down. Iran is the only coun-
try of our dozen where religious scholars have seized executive and ju-
dicial power and oversee the governance of the state. However, over the
last decades, social, intellectual and political movements have vigorously
advocated legal change – with some limited successes – and reformers
have gained an increasing amount of support. During the 2009 election
campaigns, opposition against the present regime and calls for reform
became massive.
Pakistan (see chapter 9), a country stricken by poverty and ethnic
conflict, had a troublesome start and until the present day is frequently
uprooted by violence. As is the case in Afghanistan, customary law is
still dominant in the rural areas. Military and civil presidents have up-
held a fairly authoritarian regime. In 1979, General Zia ul-Haq over-
threw the democratically elected government of Ali Bhutto in a coup
d’état and tried to legitimise his rule by introducing a strict adherence
to Islamic law. Large nationalist parties, as well as the judiciary, which
follows the British legal tradition, exert a moderating influence on the
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extensive power of the presidents as well as on the islamisation of the
national law.
Just a few hours by plane one reaches Southeast Asia, an area where
Islam has blended in with local custom (adat) and the old traditions of
Hinduism and Buddhism. Indonesia (see chapter 10) is the largest
Muslim country in the world, an enormous archipelago of thousands of
islands, and home to hundreds of ethnic groups. While Dutch colonial
rule recognised the country’s elaborate systems of customary adat law,
since independence in 1945 the emphasis has been on national law.
Islamic law has remained in a secondary position. Consequently, the
word Islam does not appear in Indonesia’s constitution. But this coun-
try, too, has been subject to efforts of islamisation. Yet, the consecutive
governments – democratically elected since 1998 – have continued to
steer a course with national unity as their overriding objective.
Islamisation of law has so far been quite limited, the remote province
of Aceh, however, being an exception.
It takes only a short trip overseas to Malaysia (see chapter 11), where
almost the same language is spoken. This country provides a home to
both the Islamic Malay population as well as a large minority group of
Chinese, has, like other Muslim countries, seen a rise of Islamist move-
ments in the last decade. These movements strongly contrast the older,
more tolerant and moderate form of Islam that has been the mainstay
of Malaysia’s history. The judiciary, operating in a British legal tradition,
has had to play a crucial role in dissolving conflicts that arise out of the
more assertive stance of ‘puritan’ Muslim movements.
From one region in the ‘periphery of the Muslim world’ to another:
Sub-Saharan Africa. In poverty-stricken Mali (see chapter 12), an ex-
French colony, the state is fairly secular by nature, and the predomi-
nantly rural population adheres mostly to customary law. Yet, here too,
Islamic traditions and Muslim missionaries have left their mark on po-
litico-legal developments. Mali, relying on development aid, is con-
fronted with Western donors who wish to improve the position of wo-
men, and with Islamic donors such as Saudi Arabia who wish to in-
crease the influence of classical sharia. To date, the government has
been able to preserve stability and steer a course of compromise be-
tween the conflicting forces.
The final stage of our journey takes us to Nigeria (see chapter 13), the
most populous country in Africa, which is divided into an Islamic
North and a Christian South. This federal state, rich in oil, has experi-
enced many violent conflicts, both between tribal as well as between re-
ligious groups. Military coups brought the country under army rule for
long periods. Only since 1999 civilian rule has been reinstated. The
year 2000 marked the significant event of eleven provinces in the
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North promulgating Islamic criminal law. Ten years later this book re-
constructs the events and takes stock of the results.
After this cursory voyage you have reached the end of the introductory
chapter. Hopefully you are now prepared to immerse yourself into the
fascinating individual country chapters, and to gain, while reading, an
ever more complete overview and deeper insight into how sharia has
been incorporated in national legal systems throughout the Muslim
world.
Note to Preface
1 Berger 2006; Otto 2006; Otto, Dekker & Van Soest-Zuurdeeg 2006.
Notes to Chapter 1
1 In this chapter in particular and in many parts of the book the term ‘sharia’ is used
instead of ‘Islamic law’. For the purpose of this study it was found preferable to dif-
ferentiate between sharia and law. The term sharia then denotes divine rules that, ac-
cording to the religion of Islam, emanate from God. The term law, as commonly
used, refers to man-made rules and norms, issued by and enforceable by state insti-
tutions. Of course we can also define the term law more broadly to encompass sys-
tems of religious law and religious authorities, but in the context of this study that
could also easily create unnecessary confusion. Readers can especially be confused
when in certain literature about sharia (translated from Arabic into English), authors
refer to ‘sharia’ by using the term ‘the law’, as in the phrase for example ‘[t]he status
of women according to the law is equitable to men’.
2 Except for Nigeria, see 1.3.
3 These specialisations include legal history, sociology of law, legal anthropology, law
and development studies, law and economics, comparative law of developing coun-
tries, court studies, and the legal dimensions of political and governance studies.
4 This closure of the gate has been an established theory but some authors have con-
tested it, a.o. Hallaq (2009).
5 Dispute resolution according to classical fiqh requires parties and/or the judge to con-
sult a mufti, whose fatwa will then be applied to the case by the judge. Today, this sys-
tem is still in use in Saudi Arabia.
6 The term ‘incorporated’ is merely introduced in order to point at the historical pro-
cess, in which states have appropriated the legal function of sharia. The term does
not have the connotation of a business entreprise or a multinational company and
should not be understood as such.
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